Charles Krauthammer
August 4, 2006
WASHINGTON -- Israel's war with Hezbollah is a war to secure its
northern border, to defeat a terrorist militia bent on Israel's
destruction, to restore Israeli deterrence in the age of the missile.
But even more is at stake. Israel's leaders do not seem to understand
how ruinous a military failure in Lebanon would be to its relationship
with America, Israel's most vital lifeline.
For decades there has been a debate in the U.S. over Israel's strategic
value. At critical moments in the past, Israel has indeed shown its
value. In 1970, Israeli military moves against Syria saved King Hussein
and the moderate pro-American Hashemite monarchy of Jordan. In 1982,
American-made Israeli fighters engaged the Syrian air force, shooting
down 86 MiGs without a single loss, revealing a shocking Soviet
technological backwardness that dealt a major blow to Soviet prestige
abroad and self-confidence among its elites at home (including
Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev).
But that was decades ago. The question, as always, is: What have you
done for me lately? There is fierce debate now in the U.S. about
whether in the post-9/11 world Israel is a net asset or liability.
Hezbollah's unprovoked attack on July 12 provided Israel the
extraordinary opportunity to demonstrate its utility by making a major
contribution to America's war on terror.
America's green light for Israel to defend itself is seen as a favor to
Israel. But that is a tendentious, misleadingly partial analysis. The
green light -- indeed, the encouragement -- is also an act of clear
self-interest. America wants, America needs, a decisive Hezbollah
defeat.
Unlike many of the other terror groups in the Middle East, Hezbollah is
a serious enemy of the United States. In 1983, it massacred 241
American servicemen. Except for al-Qaeda, it has killed more Americans
than any other terror organization.
More importantly, it is today the leading edge of an aggressive,
nuclear-hungry Iran. Hezbollah is a wholly owned Iranian subsidiary.
Its mission is to extend the Islamic Revolution's influence into
Lebanon and Palestine, destabilize any Arab-Israeli peace, and advance
an Islamist Shiite ascendancy, led and controlled by Iran, throughout
the Levant.
America finds itself at war with radical Islam, a two-churched monster:
Sunni al-Qaeda is now being challenged by Shiite Iran for primacy in
its epic confrontation with the infidel West. With al-Qaeda in decline,
Iran is on the march. It is intervening through proxies throughout the
Arab world -- Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, Moqtada
al-Sadr's Mahdi Army in Iraq -- to subvert modernizing,
Western-oriented Arab governments and bring these territories under
Iranian hegemony. Its nuclear ambitions would secure these advances,
give it an overwhelming preponderance of power over the Arabs and an
absolute deterrent against serious counteractions by the United States,
Israel or any other rival.
The moderate pro-Western Arabs understand this very clearly. Which is
why Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan immediately came out against
Hezbollah and privately urged the U.S. to let Israel take down
Hezbollah. They know that Hezbollah is fighting Iran's proxy war not
only against Israel but against them and, more generally, against the
United States and the West.
Hence Israel's rare opportunity to demonstrate what it can do for its
great American patron. Defeating Hezbollah would be a huge loss for
Iran, both psychologically and strategically. It would lose its
foothold in Lebanon. It would lose its major means to destabilize and
inject itself into the heart of the Middle East. It would be shown to
have vastly overreached in trying to establish itself as the regional
superpower.
The U.S. has gone far out on a limb to allow Israel to win and for all
this to happen. It has counted on Israel's ability to do the job. It
has been disappointed. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has provided unsteady
and uncertain leadership. Foolishly relying on air power alone, he
denied his generals the ground offensive they wanted, only to reverse
himself later. He has allowed his war Cabinet meetings to become fully
public through the kind of leaks no serious wartime leadership would
ever countenance. Divisive Cabinet debates are broadcast to the world
as was Olmert's own complaint that ``I'm tired. I didn't sleep at all
last night." (Haaretz, July 28.) Hardly the stuff to instill
Churchillian confidence.
His search for victory on the cheap has jeopardized not just the
Lebanon operation, but America's confidence in Israel as well. That
confidence -- and the relationship it reinforces -- is as important to
Israel's survival as its own army. The tremulous Olmert seems not to
have a clue.