Charles Krauthammer
May 26, 2006
WASHINGTON -- All of a sudden, revolutionary Iran has offered
direct talks with the United States. All of a sudden, the usual
suspects -- European commentators, American liberals, dissident CIA
analysts, Madeleine Albright -- are urging the administration to take
the bait.
It is not rare to see a regime like Iran's -- despotic, internally
weak, feeling the world closing in -- attempt so transparent a ploy to
relieve pressure on itself. What is rare is to see the craven alacrity
with which such a ploy is taken up by others.
Mark my words. The momentum for U.S.-Iran negotiations has only begun.
The focus of the entire Iranian crisis will begin to shift from the
question of whether Tehran will stop its nuclear program to whether
Washington will sit down alone at the table with Tehran.
To this cynical bait-and-switch, there can be no American response
other than No. Absolutely not.
Just yesterday the world was excoriating the Bush administration for
its unilateralism -- on Kyoto, the ABM Treaty and most especially Iraq
-- and demanding that Washington act in concert with the
``international community.'' Just yesterday, the Democratic candidate
for president attacked Bush's foreign policy precisely for refusing to
consult with, listen to and work with ``the allies.''
Another day, another principle. Bush is now being pressured to abandon
multilateralism and go it alone with Iran. Remember: In September 2003,
after Iran was discovered cheating on its nuclear program, the U.S.
wanted immediate U.N. action. The allies argued for a softer approach.
Britain, France and Germany wanted to negotiate with Tehran and offer
diplomatic and economic carrots in return for Iran giving up its
nuclear weapons program. The U.S. acquiesced.
After two and a half years of utter futility, the EU-3 had to admit
failure and acknowledge the obvious: Iran had no intention of giving up
its nuclear ambitions. Iran made the point irrefutable when it broke
IAEA seals and brazenly resumed uranium enrichment.
The full understanding we had with our allies was that if the EU-3
process failed, we would together go to the Security Council and get
sanctions imposed on Iran. Yes, Russia and China might still stand in
the way. But even so, concerted sanctions by America, Europe and other
economic powers could have devastating effects on Iran and on its shaky
clerical dictatorship.
Which is why the mullahs launched this recent initiative. They know,
and fear, that if the West persists on its present and agreed course,
they face sanctions so serious that their rule, already unpopular,
might be in jeopardy. The very fact that Iran is desperately trying to
change the subject, change the venue and shift the burden onto the U.S.
shows how close the mullahs believe we are to achieving major
international pressure on them.
Pushing Washington to abandon the multilateral process and enter
negotiations alone is more than just rank hypocrisy. It is a pernicious
folly. It would short-circuit the process that after years of dithering
is about to yield its first fruits -- sanctions that Tehran fears. It
would undo the allied consensus, produce endless new delays and give
Iran more time to reach the point of no return, after which its nuclear
status would be a fait accompli.
Entering negotiations carries with it the responsibility to do
something if they fail. The EU-3 understood that when they took on the
mullahs a couple of years ago. Bilateral U.S.-Iran talks are the
perfect way to now get Europe off the hook. They would pre-empt all the
current discussions about sanctions, place all responsibility for
success on U.S.-Iran negotiations and set America up to take the blame
for their inevitable failure.
It is an obvious trap. We should resolutely say no.
Except on one condition. If the allies, rather than shift
responsibility for this entire process back to Washington, will
reassert their responsibility by pledging support for U.S. and/or
coalition military action against Iran in the event that the bilateral
U.S.-Iran talks fail, then we might achieve something.
You want us to talk? Fine. We will go there but only if you arm us with
the largest stick of all: your public support for military action if
the talks fail. The mullahs already fear economic sanctions; they will
fear European-backed U.S. military action infinitely more. Such
negotiations might actually accomplish something.
That's our condition. Otherwise, the entire suggestion of bilateral
talks is a ploy that should be rejected with the same contempt with
which it was proposed.