Last year, President Mikheil Saakashvili invited me along on a
helicopter flight to see Tskhinvali, South Ossetia's capital, from the
air. We viewed it at some distance to avoid Russian antiaircraft
missiles manned by Russian personnel.
He pointed out a lone hilltop sprinkled with houses some 10 miles
inside Georgian territory -- scarcely even a town. Much of the
population, namely the Georgians, had long ago been purged by
Russian-backed militias, leaving behind a rump population of Ossetian
farmers and Russian security forces posing as Ossetians. "We have
offered them everything," he said, "language rights, land rights,
guaranteed power in parliament, anything they want, and they would take
it, if the Kremlin would let them."
Moscow's thin pretense of protecting an ethnic group provided just
enough cover for Georgia's timorous friends in the West to ignore
increasing Russian provocations over the past few years. Moscow, it now
seems, intends to "protect" large numbers of Georgians too -- by
occupying and killing them if that's what it takes -- and prevent them
from building their own history and pursuing their democratic destiny,
as it has for almost two centuries.
As we worry about another Russian imperialist adventure in Georgia, we
shouldn't lose sight of the bigger picture either: To wit, Moscow has
always had a clear strategic use for the Caucasus, one that concerns
the U.S. today more than ever.
Having overestimated the power of the Soviet Union in its last years,
we have consistently underestimated the ambitions of Russia since.
Already, a great deal has been said about the implications of Russia's
invasion for Ukraine, the Baltic States and Europe generally. But few
have noticed the direct strategic threat of Moscow's action to U.S.
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Kremlin is not about to reignite
the Cold War for the love of a few thousand Ossetians or even for its
animosity toward five million Georgians. This is calculated strategic
maneuvering. And make no mistake, it's about countering U.S. power at
its furthest stretch with Moscow's power very close to home.
The pivotal geography of the Caucasus offers the Kremlin just such an
opportunity. Look at a map, and the East-meets-West, North-meets-South
vector lines of the region illustrate all too clearly how the drama now
unfolding in the Caucasus casts Moscow's shadow all across Central Asia
and down into the Middle East. In effect, we in the West are being
challenged by Russian actions in Georgia to show that we have the nerve
and the stamina to secure the gains not just of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but of the entire collapse of Soviet power.
Between Russia and Iran, in the lower Caucasus, sits a small wedge of
independent soil -- namely, the soil of Azerbaijan and Georgia
combined. Through those two countries runs the immensely important
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which delivers precious oil circuitously
from Azerbaijan to Turkey and out to the world. This is important not
just because of the actual oil being delivered free of interference
from Russia and Iran and the Middle East, but also for symbolic
reasons. It says to the world that if any former Moscow colonies wish
to sell their wares to the West directly, they have a right to do so,
and the West will support that right. According to Georgian
authorities, Russian warplanes have tried to demolish the Georgian leg
of that pipeline several times in the last days. Their message cannot
be clearer.
Besides their own pipeline, Georgia and Azerbaijan offer a fragile
strategic conduit between the West and the "stans" of Central Asia --
including Afghanistan -- an area that the Soviets once controlled in
toto. We should remember that an isolated Central Asia means an
isolated Afghanistan. Look at the countries surrounding Afghanistan --
all former Soviet colonies, then Iran, then Pakistan.
The natural resources of Central Asia, from Turkmenistan's natural gas
to Kazakhstan's abundant oil, cannot reach the West free of Russia and
Iran except through that narrow conduit in the Caucasus. Moscow's
former colonies in Central Asia are Afghanistan's most desirable
trading partners. They are watching the strife in Georgia closely. It
will tell them whether or not they will enter the world's free markets
without a Russian chokehold on their future -- or, whether they, and
their economies, are doomed for the foreseeable future to remain
colonies in all but name. And it won't be long before Moscow dictates
to them exactly how to isolate Kabul. Moscow is perfectly aware, even
if we are not, that choking off the bottleneck in the Caucasus gives
Iran and Russia much say over our efforts in Afghanistan.
In Iraq too, the Kremlin's projection of power down through Georgia
will soon be felt. Take another look at the map. If Russia is allowed
to extend its reach southwards, as in Soviet times, down the Caucasus
to Iran's borders, Moscow can support Iran in any showdown with the
West. Iran, thus emboldened, will likely attempt to reassert itself in
Iraq, Syria and, via Hezbollah, in Lebanon.
We could walk away from this challenge, hoping for things to cool off,
and let the Russians impose sway over the lower Caucasus for now. But
no one will fail to notice our weakness. If we don't draw the line
here, it doesn't get easier down the road with any other border or
country. We would be risking the future of Afghanistan, and the
stability of Iraq, on the good will of Moscow and the mullahs in
Tehran. This is how the game of grand strategy is played, whether we
like it or not.
Mr. Kaylan is a New York-based writer who has reported often from Georgia.
