Bret Stephens
Wall Street Journal
December 30, 2008
If only it were a parable, the endless confrontation between Israel and
its enemies would be the case of the hedgehog and the fox. The fox,
said the Greek poet Archilochus, knows many things, while the hedgehog
knows one big thing.
Once upon a time -- say, from modern Israel's first stages in the early
20th century until the 1973 Yom Kippur War -- it was the Jews who
played the role of the hedgehog. Zionism, for all of its factions and
facets, revolved around the straightforward idea of getting and keeping
a state. Doing so required land, people and arms, the more of each the
better. Only secondarily was it about legitimacy, peace, economic
growth, cost-benefit ratios or any other, more delicate, ingredients in
the overall makeup of modern statecraft.
This was a heroic period in the movement's history, not because it was
without folly, setback or tragedy, but because Zionism was able to
achieve most of its historic objectives against large odds. It was
helped along by enemies who, implacable though they were in their
hatred of the "Zionist entity," were beset by their own internal power
struggles. To describe the Arab states of this period as "foxes" is a
stretch, since they tended to be incompetent. But it was a fox-like
form of incompetence, in that the Arabs were trying their hand at many
things.
Today, however, it is Israel that has assumed the role of the fox. It
defeated the second intifada in 2005 and then promptly withdrew its
settlements and soldiers from Gaza. It bombarded Lebanon for 34 days in
2006 not for the bald sake of victory (a word that appears to have been
banished from the Western military lexicon), but for a much more
ambiguous goal of "quiet." Israel pursues an identical aim in its
current conflict against Hamas, where it previously attempted to walk
the fine line between squeezing Gaza economically without quite
prompting a humanitarian crisis.
All this fine-tuning of policy is in some ways natural to any state
that has achieved basic national objectives and must balance competing
domestic and international interests. But Israel's problem is that it
hasn't yet fully achieved its national objectives. Its borders remain
subject to revision. Its claim to statehood is denied by roughly a
third of the world's governments. The United States continues to
maintain its embassy in Tel Aviv, notwithstanding countless
congressional resolutions.
By contrast, it is Israel's enemies who have become the hedgehog, none
more so than Hamas. Since winning parliamentary elections in 2006,
Hamas has delivered a diet of economic ruin to the Palestinian people.
In the run-up to the current fighting, Hamas was roundly warned -- by
Israel, by the Egyptians, even by Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
-- not to renew its rocket barrages against southern Israel.
But Hamas knows one big thing, which it labels "resistance" or, for
Western audiences, "ending the occupation." Just what that means was
made clear by Palestinian cleric Muhsen Abu 'Ita in a televised
interview. "The annihilation of the Jews here in Palestine," he said,
"is one of the most splendid blessings for Palestine."
This kind of genocidal incitement is more than idle ranting: Gigantic
ambitions sustain political movements through hard times. Hamas is also
sustained by the insight that Israel's considerable military
capabilities are unlikely to be matched by political will. It believes
that whatever attacks come will be tempered by a host of humanitarian
and diplomatic considerations. It believes that Israel wants to avoid a
public relations debacle (so Hamas will do everything it can to
engineer or fabricate one). It believes that the weight of
international sympathy will be on its side. It believes, too, that the
last thing Israel wants is to reoccupy Gaza, with all the costs and
complications that entails.
Hamas believes, in short, that while Israel will do many things, and do
them well, it will not do the main thing. And that, in turn, means that
as Israel exhausts its target list, as eventually it will, the storm
will pass. Then the green flag of the movement will fly defiantly over
the tallest building left standing, its prestige hugely boosted -- and
Israel's commensurately diminished -- throughout the Muslim world.
Does all this also mean that Israel's attacks amount to a fool's
errand? Outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert likes to point out that no
Hezbollah rockets have fallen on Israeli soil since August 2006 --
never mind that Hezbollah is both politically and militarily more
powerful today than it was before the war. A similar outcome in Gaza
would be equally disastrous.
This is not a counsel of restraint, of which Israel has shown more than
enough through years of provocation. It is merely to point out that no
ingenious conceit can disguise the fact that war offers no outcome
other than victory or defeat. This is one big thing that Hamas
understands, and that Israel must as well. The fox cannot beat the
hedgehog. But the bigger hedgehog can -- and in this case must --
defeat the smaller one.